<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Patents and Pandemics</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2009/07/09/patents-and-pandemics/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2009/07/09/patents-and-pandemics/</link>
	<description>Freshly Brewed Bio/Pharma Chat. Served Up Daily.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 18 Mar 2010 11:54:35 -0400</lastBuildDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2</generator>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
		<item>
		<title>By: Davida Isaacs</title>
		<link>http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2009/07/09/patents-and-pandemics/comment-page-1/#comment-69209</link>
		<dc:creator>Davida Isaacs</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2009 01:58:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.patentbaristas.com/?p=1828#comment-69209</guid>
		<description>A few points to note regarding the U.S. approach, at least as indicated by the potential anthrax crisis in 2001 – which was not a pandemic per se (since anthrax is not contagious) but was quite similar in its possible devastating effects. 

Unlike many governments, the U.S. has NOT expressly provided in its patent laws for a method of side-stepping the patent exclusivity in times of a national health crisis.  Thus, when in 2001 Bayer indicated that it likely could not timely produce sufficient amounts of Cipro, Congress was faced with having to consider special legislation to break the patent exclusivity.  Many scholars in the field questioned whether such government invalidation of the patent exclusivity would constitute a violation of the Constitution’s Takings Clause.  28 U.S.C. section 1498 provides for compensation for government use of patented inventions, and might have addressed the constitutionality concern, but that provision does not apply under all circumstances.  

I addressed this issue in my article, “Not All Property is Created Equal:  Why Modern Court Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They are Right to Do So’, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1 (2007)   (available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968417 as well as at http://www.law.gmu.edu/gmulawreview/issues/15-1).

Davida Isaacs
Associate Professor of Law</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A few points to note regarding the U.S. approach, at least as indicated by the potential anthrax crisis in 2001 – which was not a pandemic per se (since anthrax is not contagious) but was quite similar in its possible devastating effects. </p>
<p>Unlike many governments, the U.S. has NOT expressly provided in its patent laws for a method of side-stepping the patent exclusivity in times of a national health crisis.  Thus, when in 2001 Bayer indicated that it likely could not timely produce sufficient amounts of Cipro, Congress was faced with having to consider special legislation to break the patent exclusivity.  Many scholars in the field questioned whether such government invalidation of the patent exclusivity would constitute a violation of the Constitution’s Takings Clause.  28 U.S.C. section 1498 provides for compensation for government use of patented inventions, and might have addressed the constitutionality concern, but that provision does not apply under all circumstances.  </p>
<p>I addressed this issue in my article, “Not All Property is Created Equal:  Why Modern Court Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They are Right to Do So’, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1 (2007)   (available at: <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968417" rel="nofollow">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968417</a> as well as at <a href="http://www.law.gmu.edu/gmulawreview/issues/15-1)" rel="nofollow">http://www.law.gmu.edu/gmulawreview/issues/15-1)</a>.</p>
<p>Davida Isaacs<br />
Associate Professor of Law</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Patents and Pandemics &#124; swine flu pandemic</title>
		<link>http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2009/07/09/patents-and-pandemics/comment-page-1/#comment-69198</link>
		<dc:creator>Patents and Pandemics &#124; swine flu pandemic</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2009 21:58:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.patentbaristas.com/?p=1828#comment-69198</guid>
		<description>[...] from:  Patents and Pandemics   Bookmark It                    Hide Sites    $$(&#039;div.d3413&#039;).each( function(e) { [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] from:  Patents and Pandemics   Bookmark It                    Hide Sites    $$(&#39;div.d3413&#39;).each( function(e) { [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
